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Guarding the Gates with Two Faces:
International Law and Political Reconstruction
SUSAN MARKS

For all its achievements during the Cold War years, international law was
inevitably one of the casualties of superpower rivalry. With perhaps equal
inevitability, the fall of communism was seen to herald a return to vigor, a new
phase of disciplinary regeneration. International law-freed at last from the
constraints which had "deformed" it, "ensured its ineffectiveness," 1 and kept
scholars on the defensive with respect to its "very existence" 2-appeared set
to take an active part in the building of a new post-Cold War world. Where
before there was stasis, the prospect of an alliance with the forces of change
now opened up.' One of the most acute analyses of this moment in
international legal history can be found in a short article by David Kennedy,
entitled "Turning to Market Democracy: A Tale of Two Architectures."I The
article deserves more attention than it has received.
In this article, Kennedy examines European economic relations in the
early 1990s, contrasting the 1992 program of the European Community (EC)
with Eastern European dealings post-1989, within the framework of the
international trade regime. The choice of subject was intended to reflect the
priority now being given to issues of legal-institutional design, international
law's "turn to policy." But there was a rider: "My turn to policy here is

* Fellow, Emmanuel College, Cambridge. This Article draws on a Cambridge University Ph.D.
dissertation, The Riddle ofAll Constitutions: A Study of DemocraticIdeas in InternationalLaw. The
author gratefully acknowledges the help and support of her supervisor, Professor James Crawford.
1. W. Michael Reisman, InternationalLaw After the Cold War, 84 AM. J. INT'L L 859, 860 (1990).
'"heneed for international law after the Cold War will be more urgent than during the conflict In many
ways, what is expected of international law will be greater." Id. at 866.
2. T. FRANCK, FAIRNESS ININTERNATIONAL LAW AND INsTrTUONS 6 (1995). Franck argues that
international law has entered a "post-ontological" era. International lawyers no longer need to defend the
very existence of international law. Thus emancipated from the constraints of defensive ontology,
international lawyers are now free to undertake a critical assessment of its content.
3. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, Revolution of the Spirit, 3 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1 (1990)
(exemplifying this outlook).
4. David Kennedy, Turning to MarketDemocracy: A Tale of Two Architectures, 32 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 373 (1991).
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rooted in skepticism about the renewal movement."5 Explaining this, Kennedy
observes that the supposed renewal was premised on a contrast between
developments treated as breaks or novelties and other developments treated
as points of continuity or perfection. In the European context, the 1992
program was understood as carrying forward an established project of
integration, while the fall of the Berlin Wall was taken to call for a wholesale
recasting of economic (and other) arrangements. The contrast served to signal
that the Western European endeavor was "ahead" as compared to the situation
of the Eastern nations, which were seen to stand at or near "square one." Yet,
Kennedy points out, the pattern might equally have been reversed. The
demise of state communism might be viewed as a straightforward case of the
expanding purchase of international modernism, raising questions about
succession, alliance, and the like, that conventional doctrines have relatively
little difficulty answering. On the other hand, the 1992 program might be seen
to represent something quite novel, a supranationalist, technocratic ideal with
which international law has yet to come to grips.
From this perspective the fact that it was 1992 that came to be figured as
continuity and 1989 as disjuncture was highly significant. This fact sustained
the idea, as "part of the background assumptions for renewalist commentary
... that East and West Europe confront the same systematic imperatives at
different chronological stages, that the East 'lags' behind the West ..."6 A
geographical divide thus became also a chronological divide, separating points
reached in a developmental or evolutionary progression. In this way it came
to seem natural that the Eastern European countries should pass through the
more "primitive" stage of international trade regime before being considered
for membership in the EC. This points to "a darker side to the renewal
story-a side in which relaxation of Western hesitance about allowing the
East 'in' seems only possible once the conditions of chronological inequality
have been stabilized." 7 Kennedy indeed shows how the international trade
regime helped to stabilize this inequality by encouraging, or at any rate
ratifying, the adoption in Eastern Europe of crude, debilitating versions of

5. Id. at 374.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 379.
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capitalism, sharply contrasting with the economic practices of the EC and its
Member States."
This Article takes Kennedy's lead, following him both in his turn to policy
and in his skepticism. But whereas his immediate focus is capitalism in
Europe, 9 mine is democracy in the world at large. I seek to explore to what
extent the policy choices and strategies which he discusses with respect to
economic liberalization apply also with respect to political democratization.
And insofar as those policy choices and strategies do also apply in the political
domain, I seek to examine the implications for the fate of international legal
renewal.
In the course of this inquiry, the following questions arise. What is the
character of the changes likely to receive support in the renewalists' vision of
universalizing market democracy? To what extent does that vision promote
stable, competitive economies? To what extent does it contribute to the
realization of effective popular control of public power on the basis of equal
citizenship? Is international legal renewalism conducive to overcoming
political and economic marginalization and exclusion? Or is it rather geared
to entrenching prevailing positions in the international division of power,
resources, and opportunities? Put differently, how much novelty is there in
renewalism? Kennedy's study suggests the outline of a hypothesis. Does the
contrast he draws between economic regimes in Western and Eastern Europe
connect with related ideas about government? Does his claim that through
this contrast international law helps to stabilize inequalities also hold for
international legal norms concerning democracy? Are there, in other words,
parallel notions of continuity and discontinuity, vanguard and rearguard, core
and periphery, that inform international law's approach to democratic politics?
And if the answer to these last questions is "yes," how might we begin to
envision an alternative approach to international legal renewal, an approach
dedicated not to stabilizing inequalities, but to destabilizing them?

I. TRANSmON MARKET DEMOCRACY
It will be valuable to preface this inquiry by briefly recalling some
pertinent themes in contemporary economic and political commentary. This

8. See discussion infra Parts LA, I.A.
9. Kennedy's remarks concerning capitalism in Europe appear, however, to be intended to raise
issues relating to "transitions to market democracy" more generally.
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section surveys two themes in particular. Though diverse in their scope,
general perspective, and immediate preoccupations, they exemplify
complementary thinking on policy issues with a common bearing on the
character of post-Cold War reconstruction. The first joins Kennedy in
addressing economic transformations in Eastern Europe since the 1980s; the
contention is that the countries in question have abandoned "pseudosocialism," only to embrace "pseudo-capitalism" (Part IA). The second
concerns changes to political arrangements in Third World countries; the
claim is that a distinct form of "low intensity democracy" is in evidence (Part
I.B). At the end of Part I these themes are brought together under a larger
category, to be called "transition market democracy" (Part IC).
In discussing international law and international legal renewalism, later
sections of this Article will take up these themes and categories. The
presentation of Kennedy's analysis of European economic law will recall
arguments associated with pseudo-capitalism. The extension of Kennedy's
analysis to the international law concerning democracy will recall arguments
associated with low intensity democracy. In this way, international law will
be linked with both the economic and political, the market and democratic
facets of transition market democracy. These links point to policy
considerations which, I will argue, inform international legal understandings
of democracy and international legal renewalism more generally.
A. Pseudo-Capitalism
If the fall of the Berlin Wall brought high hopes for economic growth in
Eastern Europe, these hopes were quickly dashed. By the mid-1990s, the
experience of most countries in the region was declining industrial output,
high levels of wage-price inflation, rising unemployment, and, in some cases,
near-economic collapse. Expressing a view that is gaining currency among
commentators," economists Alice Amsden, Jacek Kochanowicz, and Lance

10. See, e.g., Robert A. Dal, Why All Democratic Countries Have Mixed Economies, in
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNrrY 259 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993); Robert A. Dahl, Why Free
Markets Are Not Enough, in CAPrIAuSM, SoCIASM, AND DEMOCRACY REVISITED 76 (L Diamond & M.

Plattnereds., 1993); A. Przeworski, The NeoliberalFallacy in CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
RVISITED, supra.
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Taylor attribute this state of affairs to two principal factors." These factors
are held to apply to some degree throughout the former Eastern bloc, for all
the tremendous divergences in policies, circumstances, traditions, and
demographics that prevail there.
The first factor is that the economic and social assets these countries
already had were ignored and squandered. Viable state-owned enterprises
were allowed to fold; world-class research and development institutions were
permitted to decline; highly skilled workforces were underutilized and wasted;
and social infrastructure was left without support. As Amsden and her
associates put it, "the architects of Eastern Europe's transition to a market
economy generally regarded socialism's legacies as uniform liabilities."' 2
Patently, the command economies had profound deficiencies, which prevented
them from flourishing. But, along with the failures, there were also some
notable successes, especially in the areas of education, technical know-how,
social security, and in some industrial sectors. Policymakers in the Eastern
bloc countries largely turned their backs on these successes. In contrast to the
pragmatic approach to reconstruction adopted after World War II by Germany,
Italy, and Japan, in which whatever was economically valuable from the old
regime was salvaged and mobilized, post-Cold War reconstruction was guided
by an ideological approach admitting of no distinction between babies and
bath water. "For ideological reasons ... policymakers rejected the entire
socialist inheritance."' 3
The second factor that is said to account for economic under-performance
in Eastern Europe arises from what was put in the place of this socialist
inheritance. Creating free markets with limited institutionalized regulation,
many countries embraced policies that recalled the laissez-fairetheories of the
eighteenth century. Capitalism's pioneers today have mixed economies, in
which market activity is coordinated, constrained, and controlled to a
significant degree by government intervention. But the Eastern European
approach departs not only from the current economic practices of advanced
industrial countries. Amsden and her colleagues point out that it also departs
from the economic policies of most late-industrializing countries, including
those of East Asia. These nations have sought neither to reproduce Western

11. See ALICE H. AMSDENET AL., THE MARKET MEETS ITS MATCH: RESTRUCTURINo THE ECONOMIES
OF EAsTERN EUROPE (1994).
12. Id. at 1.
13. Id. at 1-2.
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economies nor to revive Adam Smith. Instead, they have fashioned new
models, adapted to the need to gain ground in the distinctive economic
environment of the late twentieth century. A key dimension of all these
models is institution-building. In the East Asian versions, for instance, state
agencies of various kinds play an important role in shaping, directing, and
implementing industrial and trade policy, and in distributing resources. Not
so in Eastern Europe, where overriding faith has been placed in the market (as
the critics' term "market fundamentalism" conveys), and institution-building
has been largely confined to the legal systems, stock exchanges, and the like,
needed to underwrite the market. Thus, for instance, privatization programs
have transferred to the private sector the huge and vital tasks associated with
economic restructuring.
Why this "moral crusade of market fundamentalism,""' as Amsden and her
colleagues call it? In the first place, they argue, again, that ideology is ruling.
While for East Asian policymakers the market mechanism has an instrumental
value, for their Eastern European counterparts it has assumed an intrinsic
significance that transcends considerations of utility or disutility. This
highlights the extent to which this second factor affecting Eastern European
economic performance is related to the first. The same logic which dictated
that the communist legacy was wholly discredited and left nothing worth
retaining also prescribed that the new was to be the opposite of the old.
Where once there was the all-determining plan, the overblown bureaucracy,
and the omnipotent state, now there was to be no macroeconomic planning,
few large-scale institutions or enterprises of any kind (public or even private),
and an emasculated state. With the absolute denigration of Eastern Europe's
economic history came the caricatural idealization of Western Europe's.
In this account there is also another reason for the crusade of market
fundamentalism. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
made loans to the countries concerned, with conditions attached that served
to constrain the options open to Eastern European policymakers. The crusade
on which the latter embarked was not, in other words, wholly their own
initiative. The conditions imposed by the international financial institutions
were to a significant degree shaped by the neoliberal economic outlook which
prevailed in the United States at the time. This neoliberalism is widely linked
to the sense of "declinism" and fall from hegemonic status of the United

14. Id. at 4.
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States, and to the economic challenges coming from relative newcomers to the
ranks of the highly industrialized and technologically advanced countries.
According to Amsden and her colleagues, it was thus owing to "the United
States' crisis of self-confidence" that "[i]n reaction to the rise of the East
Asian late-industrializers, American and hence Bretton Woods policies
exaggerated the virtues of free markets .... Just as the eastern regions of
Europe served during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries as the agrarian base
for the industrializing nations further west, so now these same regions were
being encouraged to "specialize in low-end goods, despite equally gloomy
prospects for success." 6 Eastern Europe was to forswear advanced-industrial,
let alone post-industrial, ambitions. These authors conclude that "Eastern
been assigned a place in the international economy roughly
Europe has ...
comparable to what it occupied in earlier centuries: that of a poor cousin in
the division of labour with the rest of Europe." 7 Despite-or rather, in part
because of-a perception that post-Cold War reconstruction called for a
complete reversal of fortune, there was thus a sense in which fortunes were
not to change at all.
Amsden and her associates refer to the post-Cold War economic systems
established in Eastern Europe as "pseudo-capitalism."' 8 By this they mean
that these systems, with their preference for small firms and weak states, fail
to build the institutional framework necessary for long-term capitalist
development. The transition has, according to these analysts, been one from
"pseudo-socialism"--where an institutional framework conducive to sustained
growth was likewise lacking, albeit in different respects-to "pseudocapitalism."' 9 This points to another sense in which things have changed for
Eastern Europe, only to remain the same.
"Pseudo-capitalism" patently presupposes that there are, or may be, other
forms of capitalism that can better claim to be "real" or genuine. The
economists who employ this term recognize, of course, that capitalism has
many variants, and that it has no fixed, authentic essence. Their point is
precisely that Eastern European policymakers need to develop their own
economic models for their own conditions, rather than seeking to emulate the
experience of a distant time and place. But the contrast implied in the term
",1

15. Id. at5.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18.Id. at2.
19. Id. at 4.
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"pseudo-capitalism" is useful, for it brings into focus the central claim that
Eastern Europe is not only erring in copying. It is compounding the error by
copying "the wrong capitalist model,"2' one which no Western nation,
nor-perhaps more significantly-any of the successful late-industrializing
nations, employs for itself.
B. Low Intensity Democracy

The other theme to be noted here also posits that reconstruction is being
pinned to the wrong model. In this case, however, the concern is principally
with the political, rather than the economic, dimensions of reconstruction.
Thus, the models in contention are models of democracy, rather than models
of capitalism.2 ' And in this case the focus of attention is Africa, Latin
America, and Asia, rather than Eastern Europe.
In the years since 1989 more of the world's population than ever before
has had the "quintessentially liberal democratic experience of voting in free
elections." ' This is clearly a development of enormous significance. But
what are the prospects for realizing the aspirations it raised? After so many
national conferences, new constitutions, and multiparty elections, supported
by so many grassroots networks and armies of international consultants and
observers, the democratic ideals of self-rule and equality appear (at least) as
remote as they ever were in many Third World countries. Authoritarian
political structures have remained notoriously undaunted.2 No doubt a
complex array of circumstances, variable for each polity, is responsible for
this. According to some political analysts, however, one matter has commonly
played a key part. Democratization has been informed by a signally
undemanding and highly formal conception of democracy, in which the
holding of periodic multiparty elections is taken largely to suffice, and more

20. Id.
21. However, a central aspect of this theme is the relationship between these two dimensions, which
will be discussed below.
22. Daniele Archibugi & David Held, Editors' Introduction, in COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 3
(Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995).
23. Barry Gills et al., Low Intensity Democracy, in LOW INTENSITY DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL POWER

INTEE NEW WORLD 3, 22 (Bany Gills et al. eds., 1993).
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far-reaching institutional changes are held to be optional extras. 2 4 It is
unsurprising if little has been achieved regarding enhanced government
accountability, civilian control of the military, respect for human rights, and
social reform, for such a conception encourages little to be attempted.
This line of thought can be illustrated by reference to the work of a group
of commentators who term the approach in question "low intensity
democracy. ' W These commentators note that low intensity democracy is not
geared to the reproduction of Western political practices and institutions.
They observe that "[n]ot only have [these new democracies] not come close
to operating a political structure modelled on actual Western liberal
'
But
democracies, this is not part of a long-term agenda for the future."26
neither does low intensity democracy involve the establishment of new
practices and institutions, designed to capitalize on the democratic
possibilities offered by particular non-Western realities, traditions, and
experience. Rather, low intensity democracy is a largely "cosmetic" model.2
It provides some of the forms associated with modem democracy, but leaves
established centers of power substantially intact. Thus, for instance, the
military may continue to wield an effective veto over government
decisionmaking after the advent of (civilian) low intensity democracy. In such
cases, these commentators warn, democracy is "in danger of becoming a ...
euphemism for sophisticated modem forms of neo-authoritarianism. '
How, then, are we to account for low intensity democracy's prevalence
and respectability as a model for political reconstruction in the Third World?
A major factor, according to these commentators, is that the drive toward
democracy is a reflection of "a new stage of globalisation in the capitalist
world economy." 9 Eastern Europe is not, of course, the only region in which
vigorous programs of economic liberalization have been adopted; the
pressures exerted on Third World countries by the international financial
institutions and by other lenders and aid-donors in this regard are well known.
The contention here is that market-oriented economic reconstruction is

24. Samir Amin, The Issue Of Democracy in the Contemporary Third World, in Low INTENSITY
DEMocRACY 59, 59-60 (Barry Gills, et al. eds., 1993); Gills, supra note 23, at 21.
25. Gills, supra note 23, at 4. The claims are supported by case studies of Argentina, Guatemala, the
Phillippines, and South Korea published in the same volume.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. at 4.
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frequently what is uppermost in the minds of those who urge democratization
as the objective ofpoliticalreconstruction.
This helps explain why the outcome of the "drive toward democracy" is
frequently low intensity democracy, for the market itself offers few incentives
for an ambitious democratic agenda. 3 With its notion that people find their
"natural" level in the process of exchange, the market is at best indifferent to
many of the core democratic preoccupations. Redressing inequalities of
political and economic power, and enhancing the accountability of powerholders to those affected by their decisions, are hardly economic liberalism's
priorities. Indeed, where neoliberal, "market fundamentalist" doctrines
prevail, and the state's institutionalized capacity for regulating the economy
and allocating resources is strictly limited, not only is there little incentive for
implementing an ambitious democratic agenda, there is also little possibility
of doing so.
The lack of democratic incentives or possibilities that follows from an
overriding commitment to economic liberalization is, then, one factor said to
account for low intensity democracy. But, according to these analysts, there
is also a further consideration. They contend that low intensity democracy
finds wide favor because it is congenial to the (locally and transnationally
based) interests of global capital in the Third World. It provides electoral
participation, recognition in principle of human rights, and some political
space for formulating demands and influencing decisionmaking, while
preempting deep-rooted institutional change. At the same time, it confers
greater legitimacy on government action and policy than is enjoyed by "predemocratic" regimes. In this way it helps to demobilize resistance to debt
servicing, austerity measures, structural adjustment, and other common
elements of the painful "development" treatment. For these commentators,
low intensity democracy "complemented the economic policy offensive
managed principally by the IMF, one of the key goals of which was to break
down political barriers to the further transnationalisation of capital."3

30. See e.g., Dahl, WhyAll Democratic CountriesHaveMixed Economies,supranote 10; Dahl, Why
FreeMarkets Are Not Enough, supra note 10; Przeworski, supra note 10; and ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL.,
SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY (1995).
31. Gills, supranote 23, at 11.
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In short, the contention is that "the new formal democratisation is the
political corollary of economic liberalisation and internationalisation."32 Put
differently, low intensity democracy is said to arise from the fact that the
"campaign for democracy" and the crusade of market fundamentalism belong
to the same holy war, the same "crusade for freedom." War indeed has a
particular resonance here, for the phrase "low intensity democracy" alludes to
the American strategy known as "low intensity conflict," developed and
institutionalized in the 1980s.1 Another facet of these commentators'
argument is, accordingly, that low intensity democracy is oriented to many of
the same policy objectives as the strategy of low intensity conflict, and is in
some cases the latter's consequence and successor. Thus, low intensity
democracy signals a new approach to counter-revolutionary intervention and
hegemonic control for a new democratic age. This approach is premised on
the notion that elected governments will enjoy a legitimacy which itself will
serve correspondingly to delegitimize revolutionary forces. At the same time
the fact that established centers of power remain largely unaffected will ensure
continuity of influence.
Low intensity democracy, like pseudo-capitalism, evokes a contrasting
term; it is obviously posited in opposition to high intensity democracy. The
analysts who coined this phrase are well aware that there are many more than
two points on this scale. They certainly recognize, too, that intensity is only
one possible criterion among many for measuring the quality of democratic
life, and a vague one at that. More generally, they understand that measuring
the quality of democratic life is, in any event, a problematic enterprise, since
there is no privileged evaluative perspective. People differ profoundly in their
ideas of what democratic life should be, and in their experiences of it.
Democratic life is not a commodity and should not be treated as one.
Nonetheless, in these critics' hands low intensity democracy is a
hardworking and powerful critical tool. The scholars use it to highlight the
limited and troubling character of democratic claims based on this model.
One need not accept these analysts' Marxisant explanation for the model's

32. Id. at 4.
33. In an address to the British Parliament President Reagan called for "actions to assist the campaign
for democracy," and announced a "crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next
generation." President's Address to Members of the British Parliament, PUB. PAPERs 472, 745, 748 (June
8, 1982).
34. The strategy extends earlier approaches to counter-insurgency. On low intensity conflict, see Low
INTENSITY WARFARE (M. Klare & P. Kombluh eds., 1989).
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currency to see the force of their concerns. Where "cosmetic" democracy
differs little in substance from authoritarian rule, while enjoying significantly
greater legitimacy, pressing questions arise as to the basis and consequences
of that legitimacy.
The account of low intensity democracy helps,
furthermore, to focus critical attention on the application in this context of an
evolutionary conception of modernization. It is, for instance, frequently held
to be self-evident that the model described by these scholars corresponds to
the most easily accomplished steps, and thus the initial stage to be passed
through, on the way to fully developed democratic practices and institutions.
Against this, low intensity democracy brings out the dangers, disingenuities,
and mystifications of democracy's supposed "first base." Finally, this
perspective simply, but crucially, serves to underscore the very possibility of
democratic alternatives. Through the implicit contrast with high intensity
democracy, low intensity democracy invites consideration of a bolder and
more far-reaching approach to political reconstruction than that which has
hitherto predominated. One of this group, Samir Amin, neatly draws together
these three points:
The interpretation of democracy that is part of the analytical
framework we offer here is very different from that of AngloAmerican evolutionist philosophy. In our analysis, democracy
becomes a destabiliser, the means by which concepts "ahead
of their time" continue to progress and spur on social action
and progress.35
C. TransitionMarket Democracy
Though addressed to the case of different regions and time frames,
intended as interventions in different disciplines and debates, and animated by
different outlooks and traditions, these two themes-pseudo-capitalism and
low intensity democracy-express a set of common concerns about the
character and scope of change in the contemporary world. These may be
summarized as follows.
In the first place, change is limited because efforts at reconstruction are
frequently informed by unpromising and inappropriate models. Policymakers
contribute to the use of such models to the extent that they employ blueprints

35. Amin, supra note 24, at 78.
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rather than developing reform strategies that address their own society's
specific objectives and constraints, build on its specific historical experience,
and learn from the experiences of a diversity of other societies.
Second, ideology in some cases plays a large part in the choice of
unpromising and inappropriate models. This is evident, for instance, in the
extent to which pseudo-capitalism draws support from the notion that
capitalism is the opposite of socialism. Cold War propaganda thus transmutes
into post-Cold War policy.. A selective and idealized invocation of Western
economic and political history helps to reinforce this.
Third, global capital also plays a part in the adoption of these models.
Loans, aid, and trade constrain the options of Third World and former socialist
countries. This applies not only in the realm of economic policy, but also to
political life. The constraints encourage policy choices that do not disturb
established positions in the international distribution of power, resources, and
labor.
Fourth, a linear, evolutionary conception of modernization encourages
policymakers to treat reconstruction as a matter of "transition" undertaken in
defined stages. Western societies are held to exemplify the goals of this
transition. Inasmuch as the first stages correspond to the inappropriate and
unpromising models noted above, slow and painful progress towards these
goals is, however, assured.
This indicates, finally, that while reconstruction appears to hold out the
promise of "catching up" with the West, pseudo-capitalism and low intensity
democracy are, on the contrary, "slowing down" models. While marketization
and democratization appear to promise full participation in global markets and
an end to global political marginalization, pseudo-capitalism and low intensity
democracy ensure, on the contrary, continued exclusion and relegation to the
periphery. Accordingly, much of what passes for political and economic
reconstruction offers little real prospect of change.
The starting point for these two themes is the gap between aspiration and
actuality in the political and economic reconstructions of the 1980s and 1990s;
between free market growth and declining economic realities; between rightsrespecting democracy and continued repression; between catching up with the
West and staying behind. Those who make the case concerning pseudocapitalism and low intensity democracy seek to highlight the way in which this
gap is sustained by an approach to reconstruction that rests on a series of
mystifications. The myth of the invisible hand, for instance, conceals the
indispensability of institutions. The myth of democracy (of the cosmetic sort)

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:457

cloaks neo-authoritarian rule. The myth of the universal market hides the
existence of systematic barriers within that market. The myth of the
worldwide democratic revolution shields the enduring hold of hegemonic
power. The various myths of origin underpinning the notion that progress is
unilinear, and one must begin at the beginning, obscure the reality of
beginners' economic and political models that countervail progress.
An approach to reconstruction that rests on these and other mystifications
is, from this perspective, itself a mystification. It acts ideologically, depicting
anachronistic and self-defeating models of market democracy as effective and
competitive policies. In doing so, it masks the palest of imitations of Western
political and economic forms as the latters' universalization. More than that,
it masks the entrenchment of established divisions and hegemonies as the
breaking down of barriers to participation in global political and economic
life. In short, it masks continuity as change.
Many of these points echo ideas familiar from debates about development.
The accounts of pseudo-capitalism and low intensity democracy suggest that,
if market democracy is the current incarnation of development, the new avatar
appears to remain as shrouded in myth as the old. The turn in development
thinking to an approach centered on market economics and democratic
government offers little real prospect of meeting many of development's
critics' longstanding concerns.' Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe puts this
with memorable vividness, when he writes of "this second-class, hand-medown capitalism, ludicrous and doomed."' Even more than that, Achebe
decries what he sees to be the inauspicious, jejune democracy of many African
countries: "the failure of our rulers to re-establish vital inner links with the
poor and dispossessed."'
Before shifting the focus back to international law, it will be helpful to
bring together the two themes discussed in this Part in a way that recognizes
their interconnectedness and names their shared critical terrain. Taking their
cue, one might propose an additional model, which could likewise be said to
inform the process of reconstruction. However, this model would not be
limited to any particular dimension of reconstruction or to any particular
region of the world. Thus, it would include both pseudo-capitalism and low

36. See THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO KNOWLEDoE AS POWER (Wolfgang Sachs ed.,
1992).
37. CHINUA ACHEBE, ANTHILLS OF THE SAVANNAH 141 (1987).
38. Id. My attention was drawn to this passage by BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN:
AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE 290 (1992).
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intensity democracy, while also leaving room for further factors that define
and structure transitions to market democracy, wherever they take place. This
overarching model might be called "transition market democracy."
Once again, this category calls to mind an antithetical counterpart:
established market democracy. The point of this contrast would obviously not
be to capture the tremendous variety of economic and political systems that
might fit under the broad umbrella of market democracy. This it cannot do.
Rather, the point would be to concentrate critical attention on the processes
associated with transition. Viewed in the light of the concerns (summarized
above) arising in regard to at least certain of these processes, transition market
democracy appears a profoundly ambiguous model. It advances, but also
checks, transformation. It encourages faith in market democracy, but also
reins in capitalist and democratic ambitions. It posits the objective of catching
up, but also forecloses the possibility of actually doing so.

II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSITION MARKET DEMOCRACY
What role does international law play in relation to transition market
democracy? Conversely, what role does transition market democracy play in
relation to international legal renewalism? Since in addressing these questions
this Article builds on work by David Kennedy, it will first be necessary to give
a fuller account of his argument than that offered so far (Part II.A). I will then
show how Kennedy's claims, addressed primarily to market economics, find
corroboration where democracy is concerned (Part I.B). While Kennedy's
claims evoke points developed in connection with pseudo-capitalism, this
corroborative argument will take up points developed in connection with low
intensity democracy. Pseudo-capitalism and low intensity democracy are
aspects of what has been more generally characterized as transition market
Insofar as the discussion which follows establishes that
democracy.
international law embraces transition market democracy, consideration will
be given at the end to the implications of this, both for international law's
democratic agenda (Part I.C) and for international legal renewalism more
generally (Part Il).
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A. Kennedy's Tale of Two Architectures
Kennedy presents a critique of international legal renewalism that
proceeds from an analysis of the structure of renewalist arguments.39 This
structure is articulated, he observes, around two distinct ways of
understanding change in international law: on the one hand, as continuity or
perfection, and on the other hand, as discontinuity or rupture. Since all
progress is understood in relation to a single project-international legal
modernism-those changes that are understood as points of continuity or
perfection are made to seem "advanced" with respect to those that are
understood as points of discontinuity or rupture. Changes of the first sort are
placed well down the road of international legal modernism, where there is
little pressing need for further transformation. Changes of the second sort are
located far behind, with a long transformative distance still to travel. It
follows that how international legal renewalism understands a given change
has profound consequences.
In order to explore further these consequences and the processes involved
in producing them, Kennedy gives an example. As noted in the introductory
remarks to this Article, he contrasts two economic "architectures" coexisting
in Europe: the EC's internal market and the international trade regime. The
circumstances he particularly has in mind are, on the one hand, the EC's 1992
program to complete the internal market and, on the other hand, the post-1989
economic relations between the EC and Eastern Europe within the framework
of the international trade regime.
The decision, reflected in these
developments, that the former Eastern bloc countries should become full and
active participants in the international trade system, but at least initially
remain outside the EC's internal market, drew support-he contends-from
two notions. One is the idea that the Eastern European countries were
"behind" their Western counterparts, and needed to go through various phased
transitional stages (including the stage of the international trade regime)
before becoming ready for the "mature" stage (embodied by the EC's post1992 internal market). The second is the idea that, until that "mature" stage
was reached, the Eastern European countries were peripheral to the EC, and

39. This section focuses on Kennedy, supra note 4. Kennedy's general approach is perhaps best
illustrated by his seminal study of the structure of international legal argument See DAVID KENNEDY,
NTERNATIONAL LEOAL STRUCTURES (1987).
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belonged to the (externally applying) international trade regime, rather than
to the internal market.
Kennedy seeks to highlight that these notions do not refer to natural
chronology and natural geographical boundaries. Rather, they are ideas
constructed discursively for policy purposes. It was not, in other words, the
chronology of market-oriented transition and the boundaries between West
and East that occasioned the policies pursued with respect to European
economic relations. It was the policies that occasioned the chronology and
boundaries. International legal renewalism helped in the construction or
reinforcement of these notions, by characterizing the EC's 1992 internal
market program as continuity and the post-1989 EC-Eastern European
international trade relations as rupture. That renewalists were making policy
choices here is evident in the fact that grounds would also have existed for
allocating the 1992 program to the category of rupture and the post-1989
developments to the category of continuity. ° Supporting these choices was,
in turn, a wider network of ideas, which, according to Kennedy, international
law likewise helped to build and maintain.
In the first place, he contends, international trade law establishes the idea
that (public) intervention to regulate trade is exceptional, while wholly "free"
(private) trade is the norm. Thus, for instance, treaty-based rules against
tariffs and quotas, procedures for mitigating swings in commodity prices, and
provisions managing exchange rate fluctuations are all presented as
exceptional measures which in normal conditions-characterized by stable
and self-regulating trade, commodity exchange, and currency
convertibility-would not be required. In like manner, General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) provisions concerning developing states and IMF
technical assistance programs are presented as special measures which normal
societies-characterized by diversified, developed economies propelled by
private commerce-do not need. The point is, of course, that the modem
industrial societies which supposedly embody this norm have long since
transcended it, if they ever adhered to it. In these societies, with their
quangos, market-oriented civil services, and private joint ventures, private
commerce and public regulation are harder than ever to disentangle. The

40. See remarks concerning Kennedy's thesis at the beginning of this Article. It should perhaps be
stressed that for present purposes what is important is not Kennedy's specific account of European
economic relations and relevant international economic law (which will not be critically assessed here), but
his analysis of international legal renewalism.
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notion that the one is normal and the other exceptional depends, accordingly,
on an outmoded distinction. Yet, Kennedy argues, this development has not
been accompanied by any revision of the prevailing image of normality that
structures international trade law. On the contrary, the disparity between
economic relations within the West and the international trade regime serves
to buttress both the sophistication of insiders and the primitivism of those
outside. The former appear as those who, having mastered the rules, may now
break them. The latter are those who "must undertake a long march not only
through austerity but through formalism."4 '
For the EC's part, it is clear that freeing private agents to engage in
economic activity has not simply been a matter of deregulation and the
removal of legal impediments. Free movement of workers, goods, and capital,
freedom of establishment, and freedom to provide services, all depend on an
extensive regulatory framework, implemented through compulsory
harmonization of national law, EC legal regimes, and common policies. In
this context, Kennedy argues, a further disparity arises, reinforcing the line
between the EC's internal arrangements and the world outside, and between
that which is understood as advanced and that which is taken to be for
beginners. The EC puts forward as the normal premises of political life that
administration is supplementary to politics; technical expertise is the servant
of public decisionmaking; and executive power is subject to the popular will.
Once again, however, the EC and its member states-states which supposedly
reflect this-have long since left behind these democratic postulates. In the
EC the technocratic character of the political regime has reached the point
where concern is voiced about the "democratic deficit."42 As Kennedy points
out, however, the debate about the democratic deficit only serves to accentuate
the distance between, on the one side, the avant-garde vision of democratic
administration-"democracy-as-management," "[d]emocracy [as] a policy
orientation" 0-that applies internally and to "mature" democracies and, on the
other side, the venerable ideals of democratic politics-popular sovereignty,
government accountability, the separation of powers and the like-that are
taken as the norm for democratizing outsiders. Again, far from leading to a

41. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 381.
42. See D. Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling. Democracy andthe EuropeanCourt ofJustice, 57
MOD. L REV. 175 (1994); Karlheinz Neunreither, The Democratic Deficit of the European Union:
Towards Closer CooperationBetween the EuropeanParliamentand the NationalParliaments,29 Gov'T
& OPP'N 299 (1994).
43. Kennedy, supranote 4, at 385.
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revision of the norm, this divergence occasions, in Kennedy's words, "an
intriguing migration of democratic ideology and a preoccupation with human
rights outward from the metropolis to the periphery. The internationalization
of democratic rhetoric has accompanied a domestic displacement of
democratic politics.""'
This "Wtale of two architectures" is, then, a post-structuralist story about the
construction of ideas. Kennedy turns to policy with a determination to scrape
away the patina of naturalness that covers the ideas-especially ideas about
chronologies and boundaries-structuring economic arrangements between
and within Europe's East and West. In his account, international trade law
and EC law help to fashion these structuring notions by defining what is to be
taken as the norm. Historical processes are viewed in terms of transition from
deviance to normalization to transcendence of the norm. Out of these
historical processes a geographical ordering arises, dividing those in transition
from those who have arrived.
International legal renewalism helped, in Kennedy's account, to determine
how this chronology and this boundary would apply in the case of Europe.
Through its contrasting characterizations of the changes associated with the
EC and Eastern Europe, renewalism signaled that the former Eastern bloc
countries were to be viewed as "behind" and "outside" with respect to the EC.
It followed that the countries of Eastern Europe had first to submit to the logic
of the international trade regime, in which public regulation is exceptional and
unfettered commerce is the norm. Only then, having become normalized
according to this logic, would they be able to transcend it by joining in the
more "mature" economic life of the West (including the EC's internal market).
At the same time, the Eastern bloc countries had first to democratize before
being admitted to the EC. Only afterwards could they adjust their democratic
aspirations to their normalized, market-driven condition.
The consequences of these ideas can be traced, Kennedy contends, in the
economic policies adopted in Eastern Europe during the early 1990s. He
observes that "[tihe particular vision of a market economy articulated in [these
policies] is the familiar, if extreme, version of classic deregulated laissez-faire

44. Id. at 384. See discussion infra Parts ILB, IIL
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'
economics more common to Western fantasy than practice."45
Kennedy
concludes that a two-track approach is in play, at variance with the widely
nurtured image of a unifying Europe. Eastern policymakers and Western
advisers alike are "advocating a model of government and law for the East
which Western states do not implement in their own internal market,"'4 a
model which takes its bearings from the international trade regime but has
little in common with the practice of the EC and its Member States. More
specifically,

[j]ust as the economic model of the internal market, with its
deep public-private partnerships [contrasts] with the ...
regulatory abstinence demanded of outsiders, ... so also [the]
vision of a technical industrial policy unmoored from more
traditional forms of democratic participation contrasts sharply
with the institutional reforms urged on the East.'
While the adequacy for the East of a vision of market democracy
transcended by the West is open to serious question, Kennedy does not seek
to argue that the EC's internal market is a flawless exemplar either.' As will
be discussed further below, he puts forward proposals which recognize that
the problem lies not just in what are held to be the early stages of transition,
but also in what is held to be mature market democracy-not just in what is
located at the periphery, but also in what is located at the core.49
At the same time, Kennedy is quite aware that the two visions of market
democracy counterposed here are not the only ones that might, and do, inform
contemporary economic practice. Indeed, the failures of imagination in this
sphere are perhaps his greatest concern, as they are perhaps the greatest
concern of the critics of pseudo-capitalism and low intensity democracy. It is
precisely with a view to clearing space and creating impetus for imaginative
effort that he sharpens his focus, concentrating on two contrasting

45. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 390.
46. Id. at 394-95.
47. Id. at 385.
48. Nor does Kennedy argue that the Eastern states should have been admitted to membership of the

European Community. Instead, the policy implication of his analysis appears to be that, in drafting
association agreements with these countries, consideration should have been given to an association strategy
informed, to a larger degree than was the case, by the logic of the internal market rather than by that of the
international trade regime. Id. at 395.
49. See discussion infra Part II.
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architectures in the sphere of European economic relations. What he
illuminates is a wide gap between universalizing rhetoric and hegemonic

reality.
B. Corroboratingthe Tale: Democracy
Kennedy's tale shows how international law provided support for a twotrack approach to market economics in Europe in the early 1990s. His account
of that approach has much in common with the policies captured in the notion
of pseudo-capitalism. But what of the democratic side of transition market
democracy? What is the pertinence of his critique of international legal
renewalism for this? What is the bearing for international law of the policies
captured in the notion of low intensity democracy? While Kennedy gives
some indications, noted above, his main focus is on the economic, rather than
the political, aspects of reconstruction. The democratic side of transition
market democracy assumes secondary importance in the context of the two
architectures around which his study revolves.
As a starting point for exploring this side of transition market democracy,
one might look at the commonly drawn distinction between democratizing and
democratic countries. The first category generally includes countries for
which democracy is taken to be an objective, a problem, and a transformative
agenda. The second category encompasses countries for which democracy is
a given, a state of being, an historical legacy to be preserved. As in Kennedy's
example, there is a chronology and a boundary associated with this distinction.
Democratizing countries follow democratic countries in a phased transition in
which the latter's present points to the former's future. At the same time, the
accomplishment of this transition is taken as a precondition for democratizing
countries overcoming their relative marginality compared to democratic
countries. Once again, international law has played a significant role in
constructing, or at any rate stabilizing, this chronology and this boundary. Its
role can be examined through a consideration of two spheres that are key
international legal contexts for the elaboration and expression of ideas about
democracy:
the sphere of doctrines and institutions concerned with
arrangements for democratic government, and the sphere of doctrines and
institutions concerned with the protection of human rights.
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1. Democratic Government
A major dimension of the first sphere is the international law and practice
of electoral assistance. ° This assistance takes the form, most commonly, of
advice about the organization of national elections, and monitoring with a
view to certifying to what extent an election is free and fair. International and
regional organizations, governments, and non-governmental organizations
provide assistance of this kind. Assistance is given at the request of the
government of the country concerned." Generally, the normative basis for
electoral assistance is the right of citizens to take part in the government of
their country, and the obligation of states to implement that right. More
specifically, electoral assistance is said to rest upon, buttress, and help to
render effective, an international legal principle requiring periodic and
genuine elections.'
Electoral assistance and the norms and principles associated with it put
forward a notion of democratic politics that revolves around parliaments,
elections, and political parties. In this notion, parliaments are where the most
important public decisionmaking takes place. Legislators, being subject to
periodic recall, are accountable to citizens. Elections, if genuine, are
expressions of the popular will. Political parties mediate between citizens and
the State.
Drawing on Kennedy's approach, one might say that international law
here lays down a vision of "normal" democratic government. It is a very
familiar vision, because it has long served, and continues to serve, as an
archetype. But it is hardly an accurate account of political life in democratic

50. For a detailed account of international law and practice in this field, see GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL,
FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1994).
51. See Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle ofPeriodic and Genuine Elections: Report of
the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Seas., Agenda Item 97(b), pan. 53-62, U.N. Doc. A/47/668
(1992) (discussing the criteria employed by the United Nations in deciding whether to respond to a request
for electoral verification) [hereineafter Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and
Genuine Elections].
52. That there is such a principle appears to be the assumption of a series of U.N. General Assembly
resolutions on "enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections." See G.A.
Res. 190, U.N. GAOR, 49th Seas., pt. 1, 94th mrtg at 318, U.N. Doc. A/49/610/Add.2 (1994); G.A. Res.
131, U.N. GAOR, 48th Seas., pt. 1, 85th mtg. at 391, U.N. Doc. A/48/632/Add.2 (1993); G.A. Res. 130,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 92d rntg. at 353, U.N. Doc. A/47/678/Add.2 (1992); G.A. Res. 137, U.N. GAOR,
46th Sess., 75th mtg. at 365, U.N. Doc. A/46/721/Add.1 (1991); G.A. Res. 150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Seas.
69th mtg. at 457, U.N. Doc. A145/766 (1990); G.A. Res. 146, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 82d mtg. at 442,
U.N. Doc. A144/828 & Corr. 1 (1989); G.A. Res. 157, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., 75thntg. at 439, U.N. Dec.
A143/868 (1988).
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countries. On the one hand, it fails to capture the widely recognized limits of
official politics in these countries. As critics frequently remind us,
parliamentary elections and debates have a highly staged quality; much of the
activity of political parties is self-referential. Citizens are, moreover,
profoundly affected by decisions taken outside national parliaments, by
largely unaccountable bureaucrats and businesspeople.53 The phenomenon of
globalization, whatever precise significance should be attached to it, has
undoubtedly served further to weaken the accountability of public power.'
On the other hand, this vision also misses the importance of unofficial
politics-what is sometimes referred to as "sub-politics"--in democratic
countries. Outside the state, parliaments, and political parties, another
significant sphere of agenda-setting, influence, and action concerning public
affairs is acknowledged to exist in these countries. This is animated
eclectically by individuals, pressure groups, and social movements from
within informal settings and everyday life. 5
As in Kennedy's example, the norm's transcendence in countries that
supposedly exemplify it has not, however, led to a revision of what counts as
Rather, the resulting disparity reinforces the notion that a
normal.
developmental gap separates democratic societies from those democratizing
societies to which electoral assistance is addressed. Whereas the politics of
democratic societies now strains modernity's established lexicon and often
drives analysts to the use of prefixes, qualifications, or neologisms (postmodernity, radicalized modernity, reflexive modernity, hyper-reality, etc.),
democratizing societies are invited to proceed step-by-step, first aiming at the
"simpler," more easily grasped archetype of modem politics that finds
expression in international law.
International law in this sphere further delineates chronology and
boundaries as regards democratic and democratizing countries through another
idea. This is the notion that those aspects of democracy ought to be put in
place first which can most readily be verified by international observers. An
alternative approach might hold, for instance, that those aspects of democracy
53. DANILO ZOLO, DEMOCRACY AND COMPLEUrY 115-29 (David McKie trans, 1992).

54. For a powerful account of the significance of globalization for democracy, see DAVID HELD,
DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995). See also Paul Hirst & Grahame
Thompson, GLOBALIZATION IN QUEsTION: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF

GOVERNANCE (1996)

(challenging exaggerated claims concerning globalization).

55. See Ulrich Beck, The Reinvention ofPolitics: Towards a Theory ofRefleive Modernization,in
REFLEXIVE MODERNIZATION: POLITICS, TRADITION AND AETECS INTHE MODERN SOCIAL ORDER 1

(1994) (discussing the rise of"sub-politics').
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ought to be put in place first which can most readily be verified by reference
to the experience of citizens. Or it might hold that those aspects of democracy
ought to be put in place first which make the most difference to vulnerable or
marginalized groups, irrespective of the extent to which empirical verification
is possible. Or it might hold that democratic reconstruction defies ordering in
this way. Nonetheless, norms and practices concerning election-monitoring
help to establish a chronology that is determined by monitorability. Since
elections are relatively straightforward to monitor,' democratizing countries
are encouraged to treat these as the first transitional stage. This stage becomes
the precondition for eventually moving out of the international electionmonitors' gaze, and joining democratic countries in more sophisticated and
complex epistemological terrain. In that terrain, knowledge about democracy
is far more multidimensional, plural, perspectival, context-dependent, and
ambiguous, than the criterion of monitorability allows. Democratic progress
is not considered susceptible to verification by election observers.
Commentators, as well as election-monitoring agencies, are quite aware
of the dangers of an approach that appears to privilege elections over other
important dimensions of democratization. That elections have priority is
frequently and vehemently denied." Yet, since no one seeks to defend the
refuted proposition, those who deny it protest too much. They thereby
confirm that it is the logic of election-monitoring itself which signals this
order of events. One practical suggestion for overcoming this is that not only
democratizing countries, but democratic countries too, should have the free,
fair, and genuine character of their elections verified by international
observers.'
If the problem lies in designating election-monitoring the
beginners' track, then, commentators propose it should be made to apply
universally.
Electoral procedures in countries deemed democratic are, of course, open
to wide-ranging criticism, and could certainly benefit from international

56. Gregory H. Fox, The Right To PoliticalParticipationin InternationalLaw, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
PROC. 249, 270 (1992). This is not, of course, to underestimate the difficulties associated with election
monitoring and evaluation.
57. See id.
58. See Thomas M. Franck, The EmergingRight to DemocraticGovernance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L 46,
85-87 (1992).
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scrutiny. 9 The suspicion is hard to escape, however, that, where democratic
countries are concerned, election-monitoring would be largely a display. It
might be compared to the case of a boss who joins the workers on the factory
floor for a day. She may insist on being corrected when she mishandles the
machines, but the primary object of the exercise is to show solidarity and
understanding. Where democratizing countries are concerned, by contrast,
election-monitoring is about certifying the facts concerning elections. For the
governments of these countries, the object of the exercise is to gain valuable
democratic credentials. A wide gap separates election-monitoring as noblesse
oblige from election-monitoring as legitimizer; election-monitoring as gesture
from election-monitoring as truth-determinant. While the proposal for
universalizing election-monitoring could contribute to a general improvement
in electoral fairness, it thus does not displace the two-track logic that is in play
here. Rather, through this gap, it reinforces the distance between democracies
and democratizers.
2. Human Rights
The second sphere that is a particular focus for the elaboration and
expression of ideas relevant to democracy is human rights. During the Cold
War, human rights instruments and monitoring organs largely avoided
explicitly connecting their concerns with democracy.' Since the demise of the
Soviet bloc, however, it has become widely accepted that democracy is, and
was always, to be read between the lines of human rights commitments,6' just
as it has come to be recognized that human rights are an implicit part of a
commitment to democracy.2 That said, international human rights law does
not relate all human rights to democracy in the same way.

59. International scrutiny already exists under human rights treaties, though a wide "margin of
appreciation" is generally applied. See Susan Marks, The European Convention on Human Rights and its
"Democratic Society," 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L 209 (1995) (discussing relevant cases under the European

Convention on Human Rights).
60. The European and Inter-American regional human rights systems were notable exceptions.
61. See JAMES CRAWFORD, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (1993); and Christina M.
Cerna, UniversalDemocracy: An InternationalLegal Dream or Pipe Dream ofthe West?, 27 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L & POL 289,294-95 (1995).
62. See DAVIDBETHA, HUMAN RIoHTS AND DEMOCRACY: AMuLTWACTED RELATIONsHIP(1995)
(examining the relationship between human rights and democracy). Though Beetham is not specifically
concerned, as I am here, with international human rights law's perspective on this issue, the discussion that
follows is heavily indebted to his analysis.
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Some human rights are acknowledged to be democratic rights, in the sense
that they are intrinsic elements in a democratic order, or at any rate rights that
democracy requires, presupposes, and helps to justify.63 These include, in the
first place, the right to take part in public affairs (the right that, as noted
above, underpins international and regional electoral assistance). These also
include a set of further rights and freedoms upon which the effectiveness of
the right to take part in public affairs depends. In this set are freedoms of
expression, association, assembly, and movement; the right to life and
physical integrity, freedom from slavery, and freedom from arbitrary arrest
and detention; and the right of access to legal remedies, administered by an
independent judiciary.
Other human rights are held to be essential
complements to these democratic rights, or at least invariable correlates of a
democratic political order, if not strictly democratic rights themselves. These
include certain liberal rights and freedoms upon which agency in private life
and individual decisionmaking (as distinct from public life and collective
decisionmaking) partly depends. These include the right to privacy and
freedoms of thought, conscience, and religion.
The human rights mentioned so far are civil and political rights. What of
economic, social, and cultural rights? Almost from the moment it began to
distinguish between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic,
social, and cultural rights on the other, international human rights law has
asserted the indivisibility of these two categories.' That the rights involved
are mutually reinforcing and, more than that, mutually dependent has become
a commonplace of human rights commentary, though it is also a commonplace
that a hierarchical separation between these two categories of human rights
nonetheless subsists. This is reflected in softer normative formulations and
weaker enforcement procedures where economic, social, and cultural rights
are concerned. Rights to education, housing, work, food, and health care
might well be deemed necessary to make effective the right to take part in
public affairs, and to maintain the capacity for reasoned choice and purposive
action in private affairs. However, international human rights law holds these

63. See Final Report on Cases 9768, 9780, and 9828 ofMexico, 1990 INTER-AM. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
74,90 para. 41. For corresponding statements within the framework of the European Convention on Human
Rights, see Marks, supra note 59.
64. The distinction began to take shape in the course of the debates that led to the two International
Covenants on Human Rights. For a relatively early statement of the indivisibility thesis, see FinalAct of
the InternationalConference of Human Rights,U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.32/41
at 4 para. 13 (1968).
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rights to stand in a looser, more contingent relation with democracy than civil
and political rights. While economic, social and cultural rights are viewed as
an integral-if (depending on one's assessment) a neglected or
subsidiary-part of a human rights agenda, they are not generally viewed as
forming an integral part of a distinctively democratic, or liberal-democratic,
agenda. Rather, they are mostly viewed as extrinsic and supplementary to
such an agenda.
This brings into focus one of the ways in which international law in this
sphere helps to establish a chronology and boundaries as regards
democratizing and democratic countries. A notion of democracy is put
forward of which civil and political rights, but not economic, social and
cultural rights, are considered constitutive. Once again, this scarcely
corresponds with the reality of countries in which democracy is taken to be an
already achieved condition. All these are not just political democracies, but
to varying degrees and in varying shapes social democracies as well. In these
countries the questions, "How much economic deprivation and social
marginalisation are compatible with democracy?"6 and "What are the
consequences of inequality for the citizenship of particular individuals, as well
as for the political life of the society as a whole?" are never very far from
public policymaking." Insofar as international human rights law depicts
democracy in terms only of political democracy, democratizing countries are
thus again invited to pursue a track not followed by those characterized as
democratic.
This suggests a chronology in which at the elementary stage-that
confronted by democratizing countries-the question is whether there is
democracy. Either certain institutions and civil and political rights are in
place, in which case there is democracy, or they are not, in which case there
is dictatorship, totalitarianism, authoritarian government, or some other
alternative. Democracy is a matter of either-or classification of forms of
government.
Only once democratizing countries have embraced this
conception do they reach the more "advanced" stage, exemplified by
democratic countries. At this stage the question is rephrased to ask how
democratic are the processes by which decisions affecting people's lives are

65. This formulation is adapted from one in Beetham's helpful discussion. BERTRAM supra note 62,
at 11.
66. Concerning the character of Western countries as not just political, but social democracies, see
Claude Ake,Devaluing Democracy, in CAPrrALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY RBVISTrED, supra note
10, at 26, 30.
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made. As soon as democracy becomes a matter of degree, issues arise about
the distribution of political power and about the relevance of this to the
distribution of economic and social goods. At this point, too, democracy
comes to be approached as a matter of lived experience. To view democracy
ontologically is inevitably to raise qualitative questions-questions about the
quality of individual and collective life and about the scope and character of
citizens' possibilities for participation in it.
In this connection, it is worth pausing to recall that international human
rights law does not act in isolation in developing ideas about democracy's
The chronology described here finds
relation with human rights.
reinforcement, for instance, in the context of financial assistance to
democratizing countries. Whether in conditions attached to loans or aid, or
via understandings of desirable economic practice, governments of recipient
countries have frequently been encouraged to view economic growth in
largely aggregative terms. To this extent, policies have been confirmed or
promoted in which the question of how the fruits of that growth are deployed
and divided-the question to which economic, social, and cultural rights
demand attention-is put to one side or, at any rate, treated as the business of
the market, rather than the state.
International human rights law's democratic chronology also receives
support at the level of ideology. As noted earlier, reconstruction in some
countries appears to be informed by the claim that the future should be a
reversal of the past, and that market democracy should be the opposite of state
Since many of the democratizing countries were those which
socialism'
during the Cold War were linked with the espousal of economic, social, and
cultural rights against the Western emphasis on civil and political rights, this
same ideological perspective helps to establish the post-Cold War
preeminence of civil and political rights. Given that the Western emphasis on
civil and political rights understated the degree to which social and economic
rights also received attention in Western societies, this seems again to be a
case of vindicating a stance which during the Cold War was a mythic product
of ideology, rather than an accurate portrait of life in the West. It is as if for
democratizing societies the welfare state's propagandists were correct: civil
and political rights are indeed all that count.
As well as ordering democracy by reference to a distinction between civil
and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights
67. See supra Part LA, I.C.
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on the other, international human rights law also builds a chronology and
boundaries around another distinction. This is a distinction between
individual rights and minority or group rights. The right of members of
minority and other subaltern groups to practice their traditions and to
reproduce their cultures receives a degree of recognition in human rights law.68
This right is acknowledged to be of particular importance in the case of some
democratizing countries where political transformations have been
accompanied by inter-communal conflict and identity politics. Perhaps most
notably in Eastern Europe the need for renewed efforts to protect minority
rights is frequently emphasized.69 These efforts are, however, compromised
by a conception of democracy for which relative national homogeneity is the
norm. International human rights law tends to imagine democratic politics
unfolding in the "normal" course as if the only relevant differences between
people were contingent differences of individual interest, belief, and opinion.
The law tends to presuppose, to borrow Beetham's phrase, that the "national
question has been resolved.'" ° Thus, democracy is depicted in terms of
citizens voting in national elections, political parties competing for power,
parliaments reaching decisions, and courts upholding the rule of law, on the
footing that identity and culture are not in issue. Democratic processes are
taken to assume national identity, not to be forums for determining it.
Elections are held to legitimate government on the basis that
governments-though elected only by some-act in the interests of all, and do
not seek to identify the polity with any particular group or groups. The setting
for democracy is, accordingly, portrayed as one in which the hyphen between
nation and state is settled and unproblematic.
In this account of democratic normalcy, there is no need for grouporiented protection. Rights geared to undifferentiated individuals generally
suffice. And, insofar as they do not, nondiscrimination provisions ensure that
residual diversities are ruled out of account. Thus, everyone is the same in

68. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 27, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 179; U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious,
and Linguistic Minorities, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 210, U.N. Doc. A/47/35 (1992);
Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995,34 1L.M.
351; Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28
LL.M. 1382 (conceming the rights specifically of indigenous peoples).
69. See, e.g., Max Van der Stoel, OSCE Commissioner on NationalMinorities,3 OSCE ODIHR
BULL. 40(1995). See also PATRICK THORNBERRY, INrERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RioHTs OF MINORITms

(1991) (surveying history of minority rights protection in Europe).
70. BEHTHAM supranote 62, at 28.
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law, if not in fact. Minority or other group rights are exceptional measures for
"abnormal" pockets of resistant heterogeneity. What distinguishes these
pockets is that diversities, and the group affiliations that are their sociological
context, do not bear ruling out of account. Yet again, this image of normal
democratic politics stands somewhat removed from the politics of those
societies which supposedly exemplify the norm. In many of these societies,
there is increasing acceptance that democracy must embrace, rather than wish
away, group difference. National identity is being recast as multiple, diffuse,
and subject to constant renegotiation. At the same time, it is widely accepted
that systematic disparities of access to power, wealth, and resources are
correlated to group affiliations. These disparities are understood to undercut
both democratic rights and governmental legitimacy, though the extent and
character of the arrangements made to redress them, and to share political
power among groups, remain, of course, extremely variable and highly
contested. This pluralistic conception of democracy finds little reflection in
international human rights law's vision of democratic normalcy.
Democratizing countries are, thus, again encouraged to normalize by
reference to ideas concerning democracy (and the nation-state) that many
democratic countries have, to varying extents, left behind. In this way, a
conception of democracy that is premised on national homogeneity becomes
the modernizing medicine for "primitive" societies facing "identity politics,"
"tribalism," communalism, inter-ethnic rivalries, and the like. Citizenship and
right-holding abstracted from membership of particular communities are what
is prescribed for transitions to modem democracy. A phase of formalism in
which group difference is masked becomes the precondition for a later
"developed" phase in which group difference is faced, and norms and
procedures are elaborated to deal with its political implications. 7 Those at the
democratizing periphery, located in this vision one step away from a chaos of
internecine strife and reflex repression, appear to have a long way to travel

71. "One of the axioms of modernity is that democratization [must first] go through a stage of
nationalism.t" Yoshikazu Sakamnoto, Introduction: The Global Context of Democratization, 16
ALTERNATivES 119, 126 (1991).
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before they reach the democratic center and become secure or mature enough
to experiment with the "politics of difference"' and of "recognition.'m
3. InternationalLegal Renewalism
This discussion of electoral assistance and human rights has called
attention to some of the ways in which international law establishes
chronologies and boundaries with respect to democracy. A two-track
approach has been highlighted, in which a distinction is drawn between a
beginner's track and an advanced track, an outside track and an inside track,
a track for democratizers and a track for democracies. It remains to consider
the bearing of international legal renewalism for this two-track approach.
As will be recalled, Kennedy contends that renewalist commentary
presents international law as a narrative in which points of discontinuity or
rupture coexist with elements of continuity or perfection. In this way,
international law can be seen to be at once responsive to will and interest (the
side often linked with positivism) and possessed of self-propelling normative
force (the side often linked with natural law).74 How, then, does renewalist
commentary understand international legal developments concerning
democracy? How, in particular, does it understand developments with respect
to democratic government and human rights, the two spheres of international
law's engagement with democracy that have been examined in this Article?
If international law is a narrative in which responsiveness to will and interest
coexists with self-propelling normative force, modem democracy is a narrative
in which the institutional arrangements of democratic government coexist with
the protection of rights. It is well recognized that both are needed to ensure
popular control over public decisionmaking on the basis of equality among
citizens. But, where international legal developments in these two spheres are
concerned, which counts as rupture and which as continuity?
The most important international legal developments concerning the
institutions associated with democratic government relate, as noted earlier, to
electoral assistance. This seems the more likely candidate for the category of
rupture. References to the "principle of periodic and genuine elections" only

72. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTCE AND THE POLIcS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
73. See Charles Taylor, The Politicsof Recognition, in MULTICULTURAUSM AND THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNTION 25 (Amy Gutzann edL, 1994).
74. Concerning these two dimensions and their role in international legal modernism, see KENNEDY,
supranote 39 and MAR~rl KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989).
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began to appear in United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolutions in
1988.71 Requests for international election-monitoring and electoral assistance
increased exponentially in the early 1990s.76 The UN, Organization of
American States (OAS), and Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) took the step of establishing special institutions to coordinate
and direct their activities in this sphere at around the same time.77 Electoral
assistance thus appears to be a novel departure, a phenomenon of the years
since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The international protection of human rights,
by contrast, goes back at least to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 7'
It is a system-or rather, a network of systems-of law and institutions that
has been steadily expanding since then. Human rights appears the more likely
candidate to count as continuity.
Or does it? Electoral assistance draws on and extends a much older body
of practice relating to the international supervision and observation of
plebiscites, dating back to the activities of the League of Nations (among
minority communities in defeated States after World War I) and the UN (in
non-self-governing and trust territories after World War 1).'79 This highlights
that election-monitoring can be seen to carry forward the venerable project of
self-determination:'e the assertion of national independence against imperial
rule, autonomy against heteronomy. At the same time, electoral assistance is
consistent with established doctrines concerning the sovereignty of states.
Electoral assistance and election-monitoring are provided by the UN only with

75. G.A. Res. 157, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 226, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988).
76. See Enhancing the Effectiveness ofthe Principle ofPeriodic and Genuine Elections, supra note
51, at 3 para. 3.
77. In addition, the OAS established a Unit for Democratic Development in 1990; the OSCE
established an Office of Free Elections 1991 (later renamed Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights); and the United Nations established an Electoral Assistance Unit in 1991.
78. See David Weissbrodt, HumanRights: An HistoricalPerspective, in HUMAN RIOHTS 1(P. Davies
ed., 1988).
79. See SARAH WAMBAU0H, PLEBISCITES SINCE THE WORLD WAR (1933) (examining interwar
supervision by the League of Nations of plebiscites among European minority communities) and UN
DEPARTMENT OF POLICAL AFFAIRS, TRUSTEESHIP, AND DECOLONIZATION, DECOLONIZATION,
DECOLONIZATION: FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE GRANTINO OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (1975) (examining post-World War IIsupervision
by the United Nations of plebiscites in connection with decolonization).
80. See Michelle Evans & Darilyn T. Olidge, What Can the Past Teach the Future? Lessons from
Internationally Supervised Self-Determination Elections 1920-1990, 24 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L & POL. 1711
(1992) (discussing internationally supervised elections, 1920-1990).
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the consent of the national government concerned."' Election monitors indeed
assist governments that are deemed to have been democratically elected by
strengthening their legitimacy. Human rights, on the other hand, are often
understood to challenge accepted doctrines of state sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs in a quite decisive way. Provision is made for
individuals to obtain redress against their own governments for violations of
human rights: Some procedures for reviewing states' performance in the field
of human rights are not conditional on state consent.' Even in the case of
those that are so conditional, supervisory organs have in certain cases
developed far-reaching and independent approaches, both to the interpretation
and application of norms and to the processes of calling governments to
account. Non-governmental organizations, moreover, play a central role in all
aspects of the international protection of human rights. Viewed in this light,
human rights can be seen to manifest an embryonic international public sphere
or civil society. More generally, it can be seen to evince the beginnings of a
new, more complex global order than is allowed by traditional international
legal doctrines, anchored in a simple distinction between national and
international planes. These considerations suggest a different narrative, in
which electoral assistance appears as continuity and human rights as rupture.
It is widely noted by international legal renewalists that electionmonitoring builds on prior norms and practices concerning self-determination
(and human rights). They also recognize that the international protection of
human rights remains (according to one's perspective) an unsettling break
with cherished certainties or a glorious revolution-in-progress. 3 Nonetheless,
it is largely the first of the two versions of the story sketched above which
finds expression in renewalist commentary. In Franck's seminal account, for
instance, electoral assistance appears as the youngest "generation," the newest
"building stone." With it a democratic entitlement is now "aborning" or
"emerging." Human rights, on the other hand, appears as the preceding
"generation," one of the foundation stones on which the democratic

81. See Enhancing the Effectiveness ofthe Principle ofPeriodic and Genuine Elections, supra note
51, para. 53, 57.
82. E.g. the procedure authorized by UN ECOSOC Res. 1235 (XLII). For a discussion of this and
related procedures, see Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTs 126 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
83. The 1992 World Conference on Human Rights was one focus for such efforts. See, e.g., Report
ofthe Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., at
3-7, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 157/ASRM/8 (1993).
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entitlement rests." If the international law and practice concerning the
institutions of democratic government are understood as novelties, and the
international law and practice concerning human rights as the honing of an
established project, then the latter of the two spheres is made to seem "ahead"
with respect to the former.
Mapped onto this is the distinction between democratizing and democratic
societies, a distinction drawn on the basis that democratization entails rupture
and democracy continuity. While this rendering is wholly plausible, it again
represents a choice, for one might alternatively emphasize the dimensions of
constancy as regards democratizers and transformation as regards
democracies. Some of these dimensions were highlighted earlier in this
Article. The upshot, in any event, is that, while both the procedures and
institutions of democratic government and the protection of human rights are
considered indispensable, a chronology is established in which democratizing
countries are invited to treat as elementary the procedures and institutions of
democratic government, including especially elections, and as advanced the
protection of human rights. A phase in which democracy is understood in
localized and political terms as a form of government comes, in this way, to
be seen as the first step towards a later phase in which democracy can be
approached also in universal and legal terms as a matter of human rights. A
preoccupation with governance, state, and sovereignty comes to be seen as the
natural precursor of attendance to individual agency, society, and the
consequences of globalization.
International legal renewalism thus serves to reinforce the two-track
approach to democracy noted above. In speaking of two tracks, it is obvious
that each is consistent with a wide diversity of actual political arrangements
and traditions. It is perhaps worth underlining that these tracks are not
intended to correspond to 'models' in the sense of accounts of the political
system in particular countries. Insofar as they correspond to models, this is
only in the sense of sets of family resemblances as regards assumptions,
principles, and priorities. Nor is it claimed that these tracks are opposed or
divergent on all, or even most, scores. Clearly there is much overlap between
what have been characterized as the democratizers' track and the democracies'
track, and in some areas (as will be discussed below) the two tracks may be
converging rather than diverging. Nor, finally, is it suggested that these are
the only existent or possible visions of democracy. On the contrary, as in the
84. See Franck, supra note 58, passim.
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work of Kennedy and the other theorists considered above, the aim is precisely
to underscore the possibility of alternatives. The point of reducing the
multiplicity, variety, and complexity of democratic practices in the world to
"two tracks" is to put in question international law's role in conferring selfevidence on a limited range of ideas concerning democracy and democratic
reconstruction.
Among the ideas in this range are tenets of liberal democratic theory
which might be regarded as deeply problematic. In the first place, there is the
notion that democratization entails a phased transition in which initially
democracy is relatively formal and statist. Against this, it can be observed that
"cosmetic" democracy risks legitimizing repression. There is, additionally,
the supposition that democracy is in some countries an accomplished fact.
Against this, it can be argued that the limitations of democracy everywhere
make it imperative to keep open the channels of criticism and transformation.
At the same time, there is the recourse to expertise in defining and guiding the
processes associated with democratic transitions. Against this, one might
insist on the highly attenuated character of technocratic democracy. Finally,
there is the assumption that the focus of democratization is properly national;
that democracy at the level of each nation-state will produce global
democracy. Against this, it can be pointed out that globalization has
intensified to the stage where national democratic government cannot produce
global democracy, if it ever could have done so. Democratization must
include efforts to bring democracy to other centers of decisionmaking as well.
Calling attention to the two-track approach helps clarify how international
law confers self-evidence on these ideas, and correspondingly weakens the
force of critical counterpoints. It also sheds some light on why international
law does this, or at any rate what policy choices are entailed. To the extent
that the foregoing discussion echoes the earlier account of low intensity
democracy, certain commitments are put into relief. The possibility is raised
that international law's ideas about democracy may be as much about
economic liberalization as they are about popular government and human

rights.
C. InternationalLaw and TransitionMarket Democracy
Both the economic and the political facets of transition market
democracy-both pseudo-capitalism and low intensity democracy-appear,
then, to find significant support in international law. It may be valuable at this

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:457

point to bring together, and summarize, the main conclusions that can be
drawn about international law's role in relation to this vision of market
democracy, geared as it is to encouraging, but also checking, market
democratic ambitions.
In the first place, international law routinely appears to understand
modernization in terms of an initial stage of formalism. In the international
legal phasing of transitions to market democracy, for instance, abstract
individual rights precede rights that recognize group difference; parliamentary
politics precedes subpolitics; a separation of market and state precedes the
intertwining of public and private in economic life. Modernizing societies are
first to put in place the conditions of formal market democracy. 5 In this way,
international law upholds an evolutionary view of modernization in which
more promising substance comes only-or most quickly-to the fittest
survivors of formalism.
Second, formalism is frequently presented in an ambiguous fashion. On
the one side, international law insists that human rights are indivisible and
interdependent; on the other, it conveys the notion that civil and political
rights have preeminence in a democratic agenda. On the one side, it accepts
that elections underdetermine democracy; on the other, it signals that elections
and other institutions of democratic government have a certain priority where
democratizing countries are concerned. On the one side, it recognizes that
minority rights require protection; on the other, it considers group difference
legally irrelevant. Janus-like, international law appears to guard the gates of
market democracy with two faces.
Third, this ambiguity sometimes serves as mystification. The chronologies
that international law associates with transition, and the boundaries that
international law takes to separate those who have reached market democracy
from those who have not, are made to seem natural or necessary. These
chronologies and boundaries are, however, neither natural nor necessary.
Rather, they are ideas in the service of policies. International law implants its
ideas, while also covering its tracks, through a number of mutually reinforcing
argumentative strategies, including the following three.

85. This is the case even if they already had in place some elements of "substantive" market
democracy. Indeed, according to some ideological perspectives, oriented toward a reversal of prevailing
realities, this is the case precisely because they already had in place some elements of substantive market
democracy, Where, for instance, subpolitics and the recognition of group difference are already established
dimensions of political-legal life, formalism appears a kind of shock tactic, the international legal equivalent
of economic austerity and regulatory restraint
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One turns on a distinction between normality and abnormality. Thus, for
instance, the notion that in market democracy unfettered trade is the norm, and
regulation the exception, confirms that a phase of market fundamentalism is
the precondition for pursuing an industrial policy, as well as for quitting the
margins of the global economy. Another argumentative structure turns on a
distinction between continuity and rupture. Thus, the idea that the 1992
program is to be understood in terms of continuity, while the transformations
of 1989 denote rupture, carries the implication that, where the EC is
concerned, little further change is needed, whereas in the case of post-socialist
societies everything must change. A final, related argumentative structure
turns on the distinction between simplicity and complexity. Thus, for
example, the notion that those aspects of democracy which can be monitored
by international observers are simpler than those which cannot helps to attach
a certain priority to elections in transitions to market democracy. This
argumentative structure is also congenial to the idea that transition entails a
simple inversion, a simple relationship of contrariety between market
democracy and state socialism.
Ill. TOWARD AN ALTERNATiVE APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RENEWAL

If the conclusions set out above bear on international law's role in relation
to transition market democracy, what of transition market democracy's role
in relation to international legal renewalism? This Article has shown how a
two-track vision of modernization, which justifies and sustains transition
market democracy, appears to animate international legal renewalism 6 Just
as the accounts of pseudo-capitalism and low intensity democracy put in
question influential approaches to post-Cold War reconstruction, so the
present discussion puts in question leading visions of international legal
renewal. The significance of David Kennedy's work in this regard goes well
beyond his specific analysis of European economic law and relations in the
late 1980s and 1990s. Even if that analysis is not accepted (and it is not put
forward as incontrovertible), the main point drawn from his work here is much

86. For the complementary claim that a key strand of international legal scholarship concerning
democracy is informed by what I call 'liberal millenarianism,' see Susan Marks, The End of History?
Reflections on Some InternationalLegal Theses, 8 EUIL J. INT'L L 449 (1997).
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more far-reaching. What he indicates are the possibility and outlines of an
alternative approach to international legal renewal.
The starting point for this alternative approach is Kennedy's "turn to
policy," with "skepticism about the renewal movement." 7 The grounds for
skepticism can be traced to four principal disjunctures between renewalist
rhetoric and policy reality, highlighted in this Article. One disjuncture, from
which the others follow, is that between the rhetoric of instrumentalism and
the reality of goal-setting. Renewalism conceives reconstruction in terms of
transition, a technical process with a fixed order of phases and stages. Yet
what are at stake are not just means, but ends. At issue, Kennedy observes,
are "choices and political struggles more than natural transitions." A second
disjuncture is that between the rhetoric of a universalizing market and the
reality of enduring oligopoly. Renewalism masks the extent to which a twotrack approach is in play where market economics are concerned. Transition
market democracy entails a "second-class, hand-me-down capitalism" that to
varying degrees and in varying respects appears "ludicrous and doomed." 9
Third, there is a disjuncture between the rhetoric of universalizing democracy
and the reality of oligarchic power. Renewalism masks the extent to which a
two-track approach is also in play where democracy is concerned. Transition
market democracy entails political democracy that is seriously weakened by
its failure adequately to pursue also social and pluralistic democracy. Finally,
and in consequence, a disjuncture arises between the rhetoric of renewal and
the reality of stabilization.
This suggests the beginnings of an alternative to prevailing renewalism.
To turn to policy, with skepticism, is to examine these interrelated
disjunctures and to search in their interstices for footholds, from which
renewal might proceed. But Kennedy goes further in evoking an alternative
to mainstream renewalism. For it is not only transition market democracy, but
also established market democracy-not only the modernizers' track, but also
the modems' track-that is problematic. In the case of his example, he
observes that the international trade system's "free market" and the EC's

87. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 374.
88. Id. at 379. This point is also compellingly argued in Karl Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic
Reconstruction: Reflections on 1989, 25 U. BRr. COLUM. L. REv. 69 (1991).
89. Achebe, supra note 37, at 141. See supra Part I.C.
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technocratic regime are "unhappy alternatives. ," Renewalism's evolutionary
logic signals that established liberal democracies already "have" liberal
democracy, and that liberal democracy is a problem for others. In this way the
"internationalization of democratic rhetoric" engenders in established liberal
democracies "a domestic displacement of democratic politics." 9' "Thus is
occasioned an 'intriguing migration of-rather than a dynamic and selfcritical engagement with-"democratic ideology."
This migration is
rendered all the more consequential by the way in which the two tracks
interrelate. Ideas from the modernizing track slip into the modem track, as,
for instance, the increasing pressure on social and pluralistic democracy in
Western liberal democracies attests.
Kennedy's tale of two architectures ends, like Dickens's tale to which it
alludes, with a vision of a "far, far better thing" than what has gone before.93
"My suggestion," Kennedy writes, "is that these two tracks be brought
together, and that both sides experience the shock of the new."" Against an
evolutionary renewalism, he evokes an approach that opens discussion
concerning the limits and further possibilities of democracy, both in societies
engaged in reconstruction and in Western liberal democracies. Democracy as
"destabilizer" was Amin's counter-vision to low intensity democracy." Could
this also be an element in such an alternative? Could it help in administering
the shock of the new to international law's approach to democracy? Whatever
the answers, it is clear that, as long as international law continues to attend
only to democracy's stabilizing potential, reports of the end of disciplinary
stagnation and an alliance with the forces of change will remain greatly
exaggerated.

90. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 394.
91. Id. a384.
92. Id.; see supraPart ILA.
93. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CrMBS 404 (1970).
94. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 395-96.
95. Amin, supra note 24, at 78; see supraPart LB.

